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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: A CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT AND ACADEMIC RESEARCH

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Addressing you tonight on the subject of Sino-Soviet relations is an act of presumption on my part. I am indeed equally at home in government and academic circles, having divided my career almost exactly between the two. As you have noted, however, my academic activity was in a field highly remote from the pressing concerns of the present and future which I propose to discuss with you. When I recall that I spent some eight years producing a magnum opus on the obscure origins of modern cartography in the fifteenth century, a work which has probably been read by fewer people than are here tonight, I wonder at my temerity in attempting to discuss the most challenging and difficult problem of the present age. Nevertheless, it is precisely because I have made such a drastic shift in the middle of my career that I am suggesting that a number of you may wish to expand your own horizon at the beginning of your careers.

My talk is in effect an act of proselytizing for the new inter-discipline of Sino-Soviet studies. A short while ago I would have been tempted to say that this inter-discipline was somewhat like Mark Twain's weather - everyone talked about it but no one was doing much about it. This, fortunately, is no longer the case. As you are probably aware, on June 8-10,

1959, a conference will be held at the University of Southern California on Soviet-Asian relations. The roster of participants is a Who's Who of those engaged in this field here and abroad. Nevertheless, unfortunately this roster is still pretty small and if one takes account only of those who are fully qualified in both Russian and one or more Asian languages, it is almost pathetic. The purpose of the conference is precisely to consider the challenges of the field, its major gaps and needs and suggest ways in which these can be met. Obviously my talk tonight would be better based if it could incorporate the findings of this conference.

Even so, certain things can be said now which the Los Angeles conference can only confirm. What is urgently required by the government and what it can only partially meet from its own resources is intensive research on all aspects of Sino-Soviet relations. The academic community can, and indeed must, make a decisive contribution to this requirement on which in large measure our national policy and our national security will depend.

Put in practical terms, one of these days the bamboo curtain will be lifted somewhat as the iron curtain has been in the post-Stalin period. There will be an Embassy and staff in Peking, journalistic posts will be filled, and many other functions of international exchange, and unfortunately of continuing cold war. I hope that a large number of you here tonight will be ready to step into these important assignments.

It is obvious that the key to competence lies in the study of both languages and both areas. Having sweated through one, you will be properly impressed with the difficulty of acquiring the other, and yet it can and must be done by an ever-increasing number of younger students.

Leaving aside the broader question of over-all Sinological competence, I would address myself to the question of the language itself. Is it essential or even advisable to try

to learn Chinese? How difficult is it? I can not answer these questions authoritatively, and indeed, very few people can. Nevertheless on the basis of my own limited but continuing experience, I would suggest that those who propose to enter this inter-discipline from the base of a sound working knowledge of Russian will find that they can, in a reasonable space of time, acquire a useful knowledge of the Chinese language, certainly at least spoken Mandarin. The whole question of aptitude for the study of difficult languages is still inadequately explored, but I think it can safely be stated that success in one bodes well for success in another, particularly if the factor of motivation is strong. There are many useful levels of language, ranging from full comprehensive proficiency in reading, speaking, and writing down to ability to puzzle out titles or key phrases in an article and to conduct daily affairs of life. In the case of Chinese, I am convinced that much needs to be done in discovering shortcuts to achieve that which is immediately necessary, while opening the way to further advances. Since our primary concern is with Communist China, it is possible that the romanization program, the so-called Pin-Yin which the regime claims is now being taught to nearly a hundred million Chinese, will simplify life for us. Nevertheless, this is for the future and in the meantime the strange exotic and fascinating world of characters - the classical which is still used in Taiwan and the simplified forms which have been introduced on the mainland - must be courageously approached.

Obviously such an undertaking is rather formidable for a young graduate student who has the problems of teaching, research and family life to contend with. I would suggest, however, that if he does take the plunge, beginning at a cautious pace in a standard course emphasizing the spoken language at first, he will quickly learn whether this is for him. The charm, the utter novelty, the quaint logic of primitive and highly sophisticated forms intermingling, will either catch him or it will not. It can be done on the installment plan.

It is, of course, true that one can establish a very respectable competence in the Chinese area studies without learning the language. The bulk of available translated material in Chinese press and propaganda media is already sufficient to bog down the average government researcher. Nevertheless, the "take" compared with that from the Russian press is relatively small. There is undoubtedly a need to increase the scale of our government and private translation services and to work more deeply into Chinese professional periodicals. New sources of information will have to be developed. One might suggest that the refugee intellectuals who have poured into Hong Kong might be organized in research, translation and abstracting groups on a considerably larger scale than at present. One useful project for some Foundation or the government to consider might be to collect a whole series of memoirs or essays from such refugees, dealing with their experiences under the Communist revolution and their impressions of its impact on Chinese society. It would be important to collect such impressions while they are still fresh and could provide a valuable basis for orienting future research projects. In this connection, I might cite an exercise conducted in 1952 which took the form of a prize issued by a Berlin newspaper for the best essay on the airlift. Over three hundred essays were submitted, many of them excellent, and these formed the basis for a major study of the Berlin blockade, by W. Phillips Davison of the RAND Corporation.

What are the subjects on which the budding Sino-Sovietologist might plan to build his research? I cannot speak to this point in specifics, as might a professor parcelling out Ph.D. topics to his graduate students. I can only assure you that within the area of government interest in the Sino-Soviet relation the number of such potential studies seems almost infinite. You name it, we don't know the answer! I recall that at the tenth anniversary of the Russian Research Center at Harvard last year opinions seemed divided between those who felt that all the cream had been skimmed

off in the field of Soviet studies, and those who felt that virtually everything still remained to be done or redone. In the case of the Sino-Soviet relation I feel safe in saying that everything is cream; it is a long way down to the skim milk. Almost anywhere one might turn there is new and fundamental work to be done. There is basic history to be written, special monographs on the present situation, and inter-disciplinary syntheses of various types.

For the rest of my talk I propose to illustrate the potential of this field more in generalities than in specifics, but, I hope, in a way that will suggest the challenge and opportunity which lies before those who are bold enough to equip themselves for it. What I shall attempt is a tour d'horizon of the principal aspects of the Sino-Soviet relation, pointing out the numerous areas in which conflicting judgments demonstrate the inadequacy of our research base. In the process, I shall indicate certain conclusions of a speculative nature which appear to me personally to be valid. I hasten to add that these are not necessarily the views of my Agency or of the government, though they can be supported with reputable opinions both inside the government and without.

The fundamental question, of course, is in everyone's mind - just how firm is the Moscow-Peking axis? I think it would be safe to say that the majority opinion now is that the tie is quite firm at present. Differences arise, however, immediately it is projected into the future. Here we find Churchill's "riddle cloaked in a mystery wrapped in an enigma" compounded by the disposition toward wishful thinking and toward viewing things through Western rather than through Communist eyes. What we in the government must do is to avoid these two tendencies and approach the problem with clinical detachment. The objectivity of academic discipline can be of great value in support of this approach.

The first consideration in evaluating the stability of the Sino-Soviet relationship seems to me to be ideology. Here we must establish a balanced judgment between two

schools - one stressing the primacy of ideology, the other of power and pragmatic considerations. Assuming that both factors exist in some dialectical relationship, we must attempt to differentiate between their specifically Chinese and Russian balance. Although there has been considerable research on the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist tradition in China, the actual status of Mao as a creative theoretician is still in dispute. The designation of Khrushchev as a "creative" interpreter of Leninism has been made official only as recently as 1958, but apparently it is considered to be retroactive to the death of Stalin. That there must be some sense of rivalry between the two leaders in the all-important field of doctrine and theory seems certain. Much must be read between the lines of the great pronouncements such as Mao on contradictions, or the summations of Khrushchev at the XXI Party Congress.

Is it true that Khrushchev is primarily a pragmatist? And is Mao lacking in this quality? We have seen doctrinal controversy well up to the surface, as in the give-and-take on "antagonistic contradictions," and we have seen retreats or softening of position on both sides. Doctrinal "creativity" is a prestige factor of immense significance throughout International Communism and we must learn how to look for it in overt and in esoteric indications.

There are many other theoretical points in which the views of the two leaders, and in some cases the second and third echelon of leadership on both sides must be scrutinized. I would mention such themes as were brought forth under the guise of "innovation" at the XX Party Congress: the parliamentary road to Communist takeover, divergent roads to socialism, party democratization vs. dictatorship of the proletariat, the attitude toward Stalin, and others. Each of these represents the manifestation of a continuing dialectical tension within the movement, especially between the CPSU and the CPC, from which we may anticipate further important developments.

Similarly, the topic of revisionism must also be considered with equal balance of the Chinese and of the Soviet component. Why, for example, have the Chinese been so

much more aggressive outwardly toward Yugoslavia's revisionism than the Russians? Is the sense of doctrinal purity stronger among the former than the latter? I have my answers, but others have different ones.

The second great field is that of inter-Party relationships. This is especially difficult to penetrate and in the final analysis may be inscrutable. Here we have such key topics as the stability of the leadership, the recruitment and composition of the cadres and the "permanent purge." Both parties condemn formalism and bureaucratism, with a persistence which suggests that their problems in this field are similar.

Perhaps the decisive consideration is that of inherent dynamics. It has been said that the CPSU has lost its "revolutionary fervor," whereas the CPC is still driven forward by precisely that force. There can be little doubt that the mentality of the Soviet apparatchik and the Chinese party Kan pu dispatched to organize and propel a struggling commune differ considerably. But dynamics come essentially from the top, and here it would be difficult to say that either party leadership is in any way deficient.

It is surely of the utmost importance to discriminate between the relative stages of the two revolutions and to determine the significance of these differences in the conduct of affairs. As a personal generalization, I would suggest that the social vision of Mao calls for vast and radical transformations within Chinese society. Khrushchev's vision is probably less precise and appears to involve continuous pushing forward along lines already fairly clearly established. The Soviet Revolution is entering middle age, but it is still in its prime and far from decaying.

The third principal area of dialectical relationship lies in the international ramifications of the movement. Here too we have theoretical and pragmatic aspects to evaluate.

The organization of International Communism appears to be taking on a new and as yet dimly prefigured shape. In recent years, a triad of terms has been used in varying mixtures by CPSU spokesmen: world socialist system, camp, and commonwealth. These deserve careful analysis. The world socialist system is conceived both as a militant, defensive-aggressive monolith, the camp or lager, and as a loose association of sovereign states held together in the spirit of friendship and mutual assistance - the commonwealth or sodruzhestvo. The term "commonwealth" in this context has scarcely been noticed by Western commentators and scholars - although Adlai Stevenson mentioned it once - and yet it appears to contain the germ of an organizational idea on which the CPSU at least and perhaps the Chinese have pinned a considerable potential future. For the commonwealth may perhaps provide the framework within which the problems of condominium between China and the USSR can be solved and the ferment of nationalist aspirations of the satellites be contained. Furthermore, from the Communist point of view it serves the by no means incidental purpose of appropriating a "good" concept of the Free World, discrediting it thereby, while turning its positive qualities to Communism's own purposes - (cf. "Peace," "Democracy" and even "Liberty").

Chinese Communist thought on this subject is still evolving. LIU Shao-chi, as far back as 1948, appears to have held a similar concept of the relations among the socialist states. The five principles of Bandung, as espoused by CHOU En-lai and developed in 1956-57, appear also to have been consonant with the idea of a "socialist commonwealth."

On the purely party side, the problem of consominium, of solidarity, of unity in diversity may be described as the Comintern problem. Must there be an authoritative central direction for Communist parties throughout the world? And if so, does Moscow arrogate that to itself? Togliatti's idea of "polycentrism" seems to have emerged as a result of the

XX Party Congress dicta on different roads to socialism. Since then, it has had a generally varied career with Moscow certainly opposed to it in its extreme statement.

The decision seems to have been reached, possibly at the Fortieth Anniversary meeting in Moscow in 1957, that an overt institutional directing center for Communist parties was unnecessary, or at least inadvisable. Instead, unity and firmness of control now appear to be sought through such instrumentalities as the World Marxist Review, bilateral and multilateral party meetings, and major international gatherings such as the XXI Party Congress.

The problem of condominium inevitably raises the classic question: If two men ride a horse, which one sits in front and holds the reins? For the present, the answer seems clear - it is Khrushchev. Nevertheless, the second horseman, in the person of Mao, has shown a disconcerting tendency to reach around and give his own particular tug to the reins, especially when Khrushchev has shown signs of faltering. Here, too, there is a continuing problem for research and study, careful scrutiny of a multitude of texts, pronouncements - for example, the congratulatory letter from Mao to Khrushchev on his sixty-fifth birthday, which has been interpreted as grudging and inadequate, or as strictly in line with requirements of the occasion in avoidance of personality-cult adulation.

In the next great field, foreign policy and international activity on the government level, the topics for research are too vast to cover in any generalized statement. We have the question of inherent dynamics, aggressiveness in the promotion of crises set against the elaborate counterpoint of peaceful coexistence themes. The changes on these are bewildering and suggest a deliberate tactical program, orchestrated to keep the imperialist camp, and especially the US, perennially off balance.

Here, too, there is controversy in the interpretation of the Mao-Khrushchev relation. What went on at the meeting of the two in August 1958 prior to the Quemoy outbreak? Who pushed whom? What were the internal considerations, perhaps connected with the pending commune organizational drive, which led to the "hate America" campaign and the shelling of the offshore islands? These, of course, are the subject of endless commentary in the press and, I may add, in intelligence circles. Again what we need is research carefully conducted with consideration for the basic strategic and tactical premises of all Communist action. On the Soviet side, these have been well analyzed, especially by Nathan Leites, and they provide guide lines within which individual moves become at least partially intelligible. On the Chinese side, Mao's military orientation and deep roots in classic doctrine need continuing study in the light of current developments.

How have Moscow and Peking allotted the roles in the so-called offensive against the under-developed countries? Are there recognized spheres of influence in Asia? What are the missions assigned to party and governmental installations abroad, as, for example, in the case of Indonesia? There is some evidence here that the CPC is the real directing factor, and the CPSU more of a front. Is there a clear understanding between the two as to the propagation of the "model" of economic development?

To round off the list of questionmarks in Sino-Soviet relations, one might include the summit conference, the acceptance of China into the United Nations, a nuclear free zone for Asia, Afro-Asian solidarity, and others.

So far we have talked about the relationship of the two powers largely in terms affecting the whole international movement, ideology, party, foreign affairs. Turning to that which concerns the two of them directly, we may first mention their basic geopolitical confrontation. Along a three thousand

mile land frontier, ostensibly as peaceful and unguarded as that between Canada and the United States, stand two nations of very unequal power and disparate configuration. China's population is over three times as large, and is growing by a relatively even greater factor. Much has been made of the "population explosion" and the dire image of a billion Chinese in perhaps twenty-five years is held to be a nightmare for the Russians, as well as for the rest of the world. The USSR is pictured as frantically pushing out into its Siberian expanses in order to pre-empt the area, a sort of squatter move on a gigantic scale.

From this "population" explosion and from foreshadowings of a successful extension of the "Great Leap Forward" into the future, has come what one might call the pseudo-Realpolitik prediction that sooner or later the USSR will turn to the West and the United States in self-defense against China. Personally, I regard this as highly unlikely. Khrushchev may have twinges of uneasiness over this mushrooming giant, but I would presume that he does not let it keep him awake at night. Rather he would rely on the bounty of nature to provide food and raw materials, and industry to provide a growing flow of consumer goods, sufficient to lead to the "good life" of socialism within China's historic borders, until such time as the transition from socialism to Communism had obliterated national boundaries along with specific national interests. For his and Mao's lifetime, he has little to worry about on this score.

Still this is a topic for both research and speculation. And also, eventually perhaps for action. We have been caught short on our demographic projections before, very much on the conservative side in the pre-World War II period. The dynamics of population are subject to the interaction of psychological, economic, and purely personal factors which we do not always understand. I would venture the prediction that the two percent annual increase of population in China will taper off sharply, when, as, and if the economic progress of the country sets up the same kind of countervailing factors

that have operated in capitalist societies. I also expect that the Communist regime will take increasingly effective measures to check population growth, including patriotic appeals, education in birth control, and if necessary, even some segregation of the sexes. The ideological transition from Marxist anti-Malthusianism can be accomplished with appropriate dialectical sophistry.

The question of natural resources also presents itself. As recently as 1956, such resource factors as depletion of primary iron ore deposits, were presented as firmly limiting the expansion of Soviet industry. Yet, since then, the Soviets themselves have drawn a rosy picture of unlimited geological resources, and this has generally been accepted by Western specialists. Similarly, it is sometimes held that China, on the basis of known resources, can never reach a per capita level of industrial production sufficient to usher in the Communist millenium. Yet here, too, the future will almost certainly change the picture. Geological exploration in the modern sense, especially in the vast areas of Western China, is barely beginning; in a land mass greater than that of the United States, it must be anticipated that an abundance of resources will be revealed, at least as fast as they are needed. Even if China should prove less plentifully endowed than the Soviet Union, the Communists, if they achieve a true economic Commonwealth, will move the necessary materials back and forth on a sort of common market basis as their growing industry requires.

The military situation in both China and the USSR will call for continuing intensified study. Garthoff's studies have given us a picture of Soviet strategy, and an unpublished work by Alice Shieh of the RAND Corporation has traced the rapidly evolving attitude of the Chinese Communists toward nuclear weapons and warfare. But these are only a beginning, both because the research base is still limited by the secrecy of the subject, and because the field itself is moving at a rapid rate.

Mao has proclaimed that in a nuclear war, perhaps half of China's millions would be destroyed but the remainder would suffice to repulse any invader and to insure the triumph of socialism over capitalism, which would issue even from a "broken back" war. Does he really believe this? We know enough of his career as a great military leader to be convinced that he combines wariness with boldness; he is not an adventurist. The analysis of aggressive and provocative Chinese military tactics is still baffling. We do not really know what Peking expected of the Quemoy episode, and whether its expectations were fulfilled or disappointed.

Important developments are taking place in the relation of Party and Army in both countries, but especially in China. The lesson of the Zhukov ouster was probably not necessary in China, where military and party leadership have a history of harmony, and indeed an interpenetration that is not paralleled in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, there appears to be a determined campaign in China to "deprofessionalize" the Army. The role of the communes in this process is still not clear. On the one hand they appear designed to create the framework of a vast national militia which could withstand any land invader, even under the impact of nuclear attack. On the other hand, the communes appear also designed to create instrumentalities of social discipline, in which military types of drill and organization go hand in hand with regimentation for productive labor.

Finally, the whole military question must be reviewed in the light of a doctrinal "innovation" of the XX CPSU Congress: the "non-inevitability of war." Again we may ask, do the Soviet and Chinese leaders really believe this? We may hazard the opinion that Khrushchev, at least, is sincere in his conviction that "peaceful coexistence" and competition between the two systems is the only realistic approach to the future. He has a lively sense of the reality of "mutual deterrence," and probably imputes a similar sense to ourselves. But is Mao equally convinced? Is there not in the "survival

of three hundred million Chinese" a dangerous implication, not only for the Free World but for the Soviet Union, which in a direct nuclear exchange would certainly not have much left over to create a "socialist" world on the ruins of capitalism? Personally, I do not believe that Mao would gamble with the risk of general war any farther than would Khrushchev, but one cannot build the concept of Free World and American security on any tenuous impression. Hard, cold, unremitting study and reflection on the realities of the Sino-Soviet relation is imperative.

The economic field presents an almost endless row of unknowns in the Sino-Soviet relations. It is true that research on the Soviet economy has advanced steadily during the past decade, and we need not speak of general ignorance of its structure and dynamics. Despite an almost annual upgrading of our estimates on its potential, we are, in my opinion, still too conservative in our projections. Mr. Allen Dulles, in a number of speeches, has set forth a balanced judgment of strengths and weaknesses. It is interesting to note that the press interpretation of his picture still predominantly bears a note of optimism. Despite Mr. Dulles's warning against complacency, and despite numerous ominous notes from other quarters, the reality of what the Soviet economy will probably become during the next fifteen to twenty years still is not being squarely faced in this country.

On the Chinese side, the Great Leap Forward leaves our experts bemused. At first there were few who were willing to stick their necks out in evaluating the staggering claims for 1958, especially the doubling of grain production. But there is a growing tendency to accept a truly revolutionary advance. If the immediate achievements have been exaggerated in the interest of launching the Leap, in any event the long range potential is there. The dynamics of a unique labor supply, of an explosive educational campaign working on fine human material, the energetics of the Communist Party, and, as I have suggested, the promising resource base - all these

portend the greatest economic Sputnik of history. But this expectation must be confirmed by humdrum research, comparable to that which has been lavished on the Soviet economy. Again many topics suggest themselves: How will the emergent industrial and technological elites of China compare with their Soviet counterparts, of which we know a good deal? Will there be an orderly rotation between these and the Party hierarchies? Will there be a decentralization trend? One hears of plans to establish some eight basic regions, within which middle and lower level coordination and medium and small scale enterprises would play the dominant role, as opposed to the Soviet inclination for the giant Kombinat. What about the three thousand fertilizer plants, the tiny and the somewhat larger local steel mills, the widely scattered copper smelting plants? Will they work?

Can China modernize and expand its transportation system in all categories to keep pace with its expanding production? Clearly this has been a sharp limiting factor in the Great Leap Forward, and doubtless much of the increase in grain production has been left to rot because it could not be moved. But again, we have the six hundred and fifty millions, and we literally do not know what they could achieve in doubling rail tracks, and building highways and bridges.

The trend in consumption, especially housing construction, is certainly on the upgrade in the USSR, and will probably remain so. Will China rebuild its villages and expand its cities? Will it successfully resist consumer pressures, and continue a ruthless reinvestment of capital surplus in heavy industry? Will Mao, who also has a flair for food, follow Khrushchev's lead in proclaiming a broadening of the diet base, with greater emphasis on meat, milk and butter?

Foreign trade and economic development offensives present a major field for research. China, despite its low level of productivity, has penetrated the underdeveloped countries on a modest, but growing scale. If even a fraction of its grain production schedule for 1959 is realized, it will

hang like a sword of Damocles over the whole of Southeast Asia. Perhaps, however, surpluses will be fed back on a growing scale into the Bloc, especially the satellites, in exchange for an ever-increasing supply of capital goods. Dumping and other economic disruptive practices may be pursued in concert with the CEMA countries or on purely Chinese initiative.

In the last analysis, this again is a joint question. Whether as a Commonwealth, or as closely related national economic interests, the USSR, China and the satellites are growing together. There is, indeed, considerable evidence that Soviet support of Chinese industrialization falls short of expectations, or at least desires, and China has shown increasing determination where necessary to go it alone. Soviet technicians are said to be less in evidence, as the Chinese have learned their lessons. Nevertheless, the ties of the two economies are strong, and should continue so. Autarky vis-a-vis hostile capitalist embargoes is one thing; within a "socialist world system" pledged to harmonious expansion, it is not permissible.

I would like to conclude with what seems to me to be the roof under which all these themes are contained: it is the "transition from socialism to communism." This, of course, was the Leitmotif of the XXI CPSU Congress.

This immediately opens vistas, primarily in the economic field, but also in sociology, science, education and even in philosophy, aesthetics and morality. Perhaps the signal tactical achievement of Khrushchev at the Congress was in stipulating the postponement of the actual advent of Communism to a stage so remote as to be without practical concern for the current party leaders, and, in a sense, ourselves. In part this was a defensive measure against impetuous and Utopian claims growing out of the launching of the communes. In part it was a common sense recognition of immediate economic and power realities.

But, I would caution against regarding the XXI Congress position as a final one. As the balance of forces between the two world systems changes, so too will the sense of urgency and immediacy in the mission of "building Communism." I am not saying that this balance will fatally continue to change to our disadvantage, as the Communists insistently proclaim, though I think it probably will do so unless there is a sharpening of Free World purpose and will to positive action in the underdeveloped areas.

What I am suggesting is that the next five or ten years will see a progressive refinement in the definition of the transition process. This too will be dialectic, with Chinese and Soviet theory and practice at times in antithetical relation, though striving for synthesis.

Perhaps the central problem is the polarization of individualist and collectivist elements in the two societies. Both parties proclaim a collectivist approach within which the individual achieves his true fulfillment. But, if one can speak of more and less in such intangibles, the Chinese duality seems more heavily weighted on the collective side, the Soviet on the individual. I say seems, and I do not present these as trends which will inevitably continue to diverge. But it is precisely here that we need research, which in turn must be based on reporting of all types, more intensive and perceptive than we now have. We have recently heard from a number of sociologists, educators and psychologists who have visited the Soviet Union, and their reports, though often fragmentary and inconclusive, present a sobering picture. This is not because the Soviet educational system, beginning virtually at birth, is shaping little and bigger monsters - quite the opposite. There is indication of solicitude, care, and even affection, especially in the early years, which our pedagogic system cannot match. A new generation is emerging, generally well educated, competent, ambitious, imbued with at least a Soviet form of patriotism, if not with actual enthusiasm for the mission of world communization; in any case it is basically compliant which is perhaps all that the Party requires.

On the Chinese side, the outlines are more obscure. The processes which are taking place at the commune level appear aimed at the extirpation of classical Confucian values, especially filial piety and family solidarity, and at the formation of collective-oriented, disciplined, selfless instruments of the Party. But the process is just at the beginning - the stage when, in Chinese Communist theory, imbalances should be deliberately created - and we would do well to discount the finality of present methods and goals. I see no reason to believe that the highly diversified, talented, richly endowed Chinese people will become robots, or that the regime has any desire that they should.

At any rate, these are the people we are going to have to confront and live with, and we must know more about them. We have begun to get a little understanding of the "homo socialisticus Sovieticus;" we are almost completely ignorant of his Chinese counterpart. We can barely prefigure the "homo Communisticus."

Yet on this understanding may depend the answer to Khrushchev's prediction that our sons - your generation - or at least your sons, will live under a socialist - if not a Communist - dispensation, and moreover they can arrive at it relatively painlessly as a result of peaceful economic competition, and they will like it!

I do not know any more challenging task for you than to see what you can make of this prediction, remembering that in essence it comes not only from Khrushchev but from Mao. It is for that reason that I hope many of you will decide that your preparation for your scholarly careers is only half completed and will set about acquiring the other half.